OrchestraOS Security Architecture¶
The security measures implemented in OrchestraOS are summarized in the table below.
Security Feature |
Domain |
Description |
|---|---|---|
Chain of trust at boot |
Booting process |
Ensures that only signed kernel and U-Boot (bootloader) images can be loaded into memory. Verification is performed by a hardware cryptographic peripheral provided by the chip vendor (for example, on NXP platforms this may use CAAM and fused keys). |
Secure world (ARM Trusted Firmware, OP-TEE/TEE) |
Booting process |
Enables a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) for trusted applications and security services. It isolates secure workloads from the non-secure Linux environment to protect secrets and sensitive operations. |
Encrypted LVM partition |
Data storage |
Provides an additional layer of protection for proprietary application data and sensitive runtime assets (e.g., certificates and secrets) stored on persistent storage. |
TPM2 support |
Secrets handling |
Optional TPM2 support, including a PKCS#11 interface and TPM2-TSS Python bindings that can be used by applications for secure key management and cryptographic operations. |
OrchestraD |
Application |
OrchestraD is a daemon that provides a secure channel for remote control, provisioning, and telemetry between the device and the Orchestra Platform (see the documentation page). |